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Audit Committee Financial Experts:
A Closer Examination Using
Firm Designations
Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth, and Terry L. Neal
SYNOPSIS: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires the disclosure of whether the audit
committee has a financial expert. We examine disclosures related to audit committee
financial experts (ACFEs) in the first year that this disclosure requirement is in effect.
We find that virtually all companies disclose whether an ACFE is on the audit commit-
tee, although the transparency of the disclosure regarding the ACFE’s background is
limited. We also find that most ACFEs do not have a background in accounting or
finance, although there are notable differences between stock exchanges on this di-
mension. In addition, we find that companies designate ACFEs who would not have
been identified using extant research methods, and companies fail to voluntarily des-
ignate many individuals who appear to qualify as an ACFE, particularly if another audit
committee member is already designated as an ACFE. Thus, some companies appear
to be extremely conservative in designating directors as ACFEs, possibly due to con-
cerns about the legal liability faced by designated ACFEs. Finally, we identify certain
company characteristics that are associated with the designation or type of financial
expert on the audit committee.
INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (U.S. House of Representatives 2002) required theSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules requiring each publiccompany to disclose whether its audit committee includes at least one member who
is a financial expert. The SEC’s final rule (SEC 2003) requires companies to disclose: (1)
whether at least one financial expert sits on the audit committee and, if so, the individual’s
name and whether (s)he is independent, and (2) if a financial expert does not sit on the
audit committee, the reasons why. The SEC argues that having at least one financial expert
on the audit committee should improve the quality of information available to investors.
Consistent with the SEC’s supposition, recent empirical work finds that audit committee
financial expertise is associated with less earnings management, fewer restatements, and a
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lower cost of debt (e.g., Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Anderson et al.
2004; Be´dard et al. 2004). In addition, other studies find a significant positive stock price
reaction when a financial expert is added to the audit committee (Davidson et al. 2004;
DeFond et al. 2005).
However, since the SEC’s final rule on financial expert disclosure was not effective
until annual reports were filed for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2003, prior
examinations of financial expertise identify directors as financial experts based on the in-
formation in the biographical data from the proxy. This biographical data is typically limited
in scope and does not always provide a clear indication as to each director’s level of
financial experience. Thus, our paper is among the first papers to examine disclosure be-
havior after the issuance of the SEC’s final rule, which allows us to classify financial experts
based on the company’s disclosed designations.
In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we provide insights on various
aspects of the newly required disclosures regarding financial experts, such as (1) the trans-
parency and quality of these disclosures, (2) variations in the way the SEC rule is interpreted
across firms, and (3) the frequency of firms that do not designate a financial expert (in-
cluding some insights as to what the audit committees for these firms look like). Second,
we provide descriptive information as to the employment history of individuals designated
as an audit committee financial expert (ACFE). Most studies that find salutary benefits
associated with the presence of an ACFE use a narrow definition of financial expertise—
typically defining financial expertise based on the accounting or finance background of the
audit committee member. Although the SEC originally proposed to define financial expertise
in this manner, the Commission’s final rule defines expertise more broadly (e.g., many
CEOs and other senior operating executives would qualify as financial experts under the
SEC’s expanded definition). Given that the benefits of financial expertise may relate to only
certain types of expertise, assessing the backgrounds of ACFEs is important. We also com-
pare our results to those reported in prior research (e.g., DeFond et al. 2005) to highlight
the differences in using company designations rather than biographical data to identify
ACFEs. Third, we document differences in financial expertise for companies that are listed
on different stock exchanges. Finally, we use regressions to identify certain company char-
acteristics that are associated with the designation and type of financial experts on the audit
committee.
Using a sample drawn from the first group of companies to file after the new disclosure
rule became effective, we examine the financial expert disclosure of 400 companies—the
100 largest domestic, public Fortune 500 companies; and 300 companies drawn at random,
100 each from the NYSE, Nasdaq National Market System (NMS), and Nasdaq National
Dealer Quotation (NDQ).
First, we find that although compliance with the SEC’s financial expert disclosure rule
is high (only 2 percent of companies were not in compliance), the quality of the disclosures
is often lacking (only 5 percent provide a significant discussion concerning the financial
expert). Further, the boards’ criteria for determining whether an individual qualifies as a
financial expert generally lack transparency because the disclosures typically use boilerplate
language. Although disclosing the board’s criteria for deciding whether an individual qual-
ified as a financial expert is not required by the SEC’s final rule, the almost complete
absence of this disclosure from securities filings is problematic because users cannot de-
termine how a particular individual’s background results in ‘‘financial expertise’’ in a num-
ber of instances.
Second, we find that ACFEs designated by the company typically do not possess an
accounting or finance background (the very backgrounds associated with positive financial
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reporting outcomes in the extant literature). The modal background of ACFEs is serving as
a CEO. Many companies’ failure to select an ACFE with an accounting or finance back-
ground may reduce (or eliminate) the financial reporting benefits expected from this pro-
vision of SOX. Furthermore, this finding, combined with the general lack of disclosure of
directors’ qualifications for being an ACFE, raises concern as to how prior research has
classified financial experts. We find significant differences in the coding of financial experts
using the DeFond et al. (2005) (hereafter, DeFond et al.) approach as compared to using
the company designations in the proxy. For example, 86 financial experts designated by
the companies in our sample would not have been identified as ACFEs by DeFond et al.,
and more than 500 audit committee members would be classified as an ACFE by DeFond
et al. but are not so designated by the company.
Finally, our regression analyses find that the designation of an ACFE is positively
associated with firm size, being in a litigious industry, and having an active audit committee.
For those companies that designate an ACFE, we find a positive association between that
expert having an accounting or finance background and the subsequent issuance of common
stock or debt securities and the level of institutional ownership. We find a negative asso-
ciation between the designation of an ACFE with an accounting or finance background and
having a Big 4 audit firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief discus-
sion of the SEC’s rule making related to financial expert disclosures. Our sample selection
process follows. We then discuss some of the insights from the newly required disclosures
followed by an examination of the backgrounds of the ACFEs. We continue with regression
analyses of company characteristics that are associated with the designation and type of
ACFEs. The conclusion summarizes our findings, discusses the paper’s limitations, and
identifies possible directions for future research.
REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Section 407 of SOX (U.S. House of Representatives 2002) required the SEC to issue
a rule requiring public companies to disclose whether their audit committee has at least
one financial expert, and if not, the reasons why. The SEC received more than 200 comment
letters, many of which criticized its proposed rule (SEC 2003). Smaller companies argued
that they would find it difficult to attract a financial expert to sit on their audit committees
(SEC 2003). As such, we expect that smaller companies are more likely to disclose that
their audit committee has no financial expert (an acceptable option under the SEC’s final
rule).
A second form of opposition related to directors’ legal liability. Commenters expressed
concern that designating a director as an ACFE, even if not publicly disclosed, might
increase his/her exposure to legal liability, and identifying the ACFE in the financial reports
would exacerbate this problem (SEC 2003). This concern persists despite the SEC’s inclu-
sion of a safe harbor in the final rule that states that being designated as an ACFE does
not change an individual director’s duties, responsibilities, or legal liability from what would
have been if the individual was not designated as a financial expert. Therefore, some com-
panies may choose not to designate any audit committee members as ACFEs, even if they
qualify, so as to not expose committee members to additional liability. However, the fear
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of added liability did not stop some of our sample companies from voluntarily identifying
more than one financial expert on the audit committee.1
Even if a company designates an ACFE, the threat of shareholder litigation may reduce
the robustness of disclosures about their expert(s) (Healy and Palepu 2001). In spite of the
SEC’s concern about uninformative disclosures in filings (SEC 2002a), we expect compa-
nies to provide limited support for their decisions to categorize a director as an ACFE for
at least two reasons. First, if the designated ACFE has a substantive accounting or finance
background, then providing detailed disclosure on the individual’s background may increase
that individual director’s liability exposure because the ACFE may be held to a higher
standard of performance. For example, a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision states
that directors with special expertise can be held to a higher legal standard of performance
(Scannell 2004). Second, if a company discloses that the designated ACFE’s accounting
and finance expertise is modest, then the company’s choice of ACFE may attract unwanted
attention by regulators, analysts, or the financial press.
Another issue concerns the definition of an ACFE. The SEC’s original proposal (SEC
2002b) would have required a financial expert to have: (1) an understanding of GAAP, (2)
experience applying GAAP in the area of estimates, accruals, and reserves, (3) experience
preparing or auditing financial statements,2 (4) experience with internal controls, and (5)
an understanding of audit committee functions. Critics of the rule opined that only ac-
countants would meet the definition, and that such financial luminaries as Alan Greenspan
and Warren Buffet would not qualify as an ACFE (e.g., Colvin 2002). The final rule mod-
ified criterion 3 from above to require that the expert have, ‘‘experience preparing, auditing,
analyzing, or evaluating financial statements ... or experience actively supervising one or
more persons engaged in such activities’’ (emphasis added) (SEC 2003). Given the ex-
panded definition of a financial expert in the SEC’s final rule and the corporate community’s
resistance to requiring a financial expert to have an accounting/finance background, we
expect a significant percentage of designated financial experts to have a general manage-
ment background rather than an accounting/finance background.
In addition to the relatively new disclosure requirements regarding financial expertise,
listing standards at the major stock exchanges also address this issue. The listing standards
are not uniform across exchanges, and they permit some flexibility in allowing a board to
determine the composition of their audit committee. For example, the NYSE requires each
audit committee to include at least one member who has accounting or related financial
management experience, while the NASDAQ extends its consideration of financial expertise
to include ‘‘other comparable experience or background,’’ which results in the financial
sophistication of the director. The Nasdaq listing standards specifically mention having been
a chief executive officer or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities as
an example of ways to obtain financial sophistication (Bostelman 2004). Throughout the
paper, we will discuss instances in which our ACFE results differ by stock exchange.
SAMPLE
To examine companies’ financial expert disclosures, we select samples of 100 compa-
nies from four different groups—Fortune 500 companies, and companies traded on the
NYSE, Nasdaq’s NMS, and Nasdaq’s NDQ. For the Fortune 500 companies, we identify
1 For convenience, we use the word ‘‘designation’’ throughout the paper to denote whenever a company publicly
claims to have one or more ACFEs. In all but two instances, the individual designated as an ACFE is also
specifically identified by name.
2 We italicize this requirement to denote that this requirement changed between the SEC’s proposed rule and its
final rule.
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TABLE 1
Summary of Companies
Had an existing ACFE, but did not add an additional ACFE in 2003 or 2004 250
Added an additional ACFE in 2003 or 2004 35
Added the only ACFE in 2003 or 2004 81
Disclose they do not have an ACFE 25
Make no disclosure 7
Disclose they have an ACFE but do not tell how many or name them 2
Total companies 400
these companies using Fortune’s 2003 listing and then exclude nonpublic companies, for-
eign companies, and companies whose fiscal year ended between January 1 and July 14,
2003 (the SEC’s financial expert disclosure rule became effective for reporting periods
ending on or after July 15, 2003). We then select the largest 100 companies that are not
excluded.3 For companies traded on the three exchanges, we select a random sample from
each of the exchanges of 100 domestic companies with fiscal year-ends between July 15,
2003 and December 31, 2003 using Compact D/SEC.
INSIGHTS GLEANED FROM NEWLY REQUIRED DISCLOSURES
Compliance with ACFE Disclosure Rule
Table 1 provides an overview of the ACFE status for our sample of 400 companies.
For 285 companies, the designated ACFE was on the audit committee before the passage
of SOX; 250 of these companies did not add any new ACFEs in 2003 or 2004 and 35 of
these companies added an additional ACFE in the last two years.4 The only ACFE desig-
nated was added to the audit committee in 2003 or 2004 for 81 companies.5 Twenty-five
companies disclose a lack of an ACFE,6 seven companies fail to make the required disclo-
sure, and two companies state that they have an ACFE without naming the individual
director. These results suggest that 391 (98 percent) of the companies in our sample made
the required financial expert disclosure, and that almost 30 percent of our sample companies
increased the number of experts on their audit committees since the passage of SOX.
3 Our 100 Fortune companies are selected from the first 139 Fortune 500 companies. None of the Fortune
companies are included in the other three samples.
4 SOX was passed in the summer of 2002; thus we presume financial experts added to the audit committee in
2003 or 2004 is in response to SOX and the SEC’s rulemaking that require the disclosure of whether a financial
expert sits on the audit committee. Although a financial expert could have been added to the audit committee
in 2002 in response to SOX, most proxy statements were filed in the spring, well in advance of the passage of
SOX.
5 To make this determination, we examine the board tenure of each disclosed ACFE. We classify a company as
designating their only ACFE(s) in 2003 or 2004 if they disclose having at least one ACFE and none of the
disclosed ACFE(s) have a tenure on the board of more than one year. Similarly, we classify a company as
having an ACFE prior to SOX if they designate a director as a financial expert in 2003 and that director’s board
tenure indicates (s)he was on the board prior to SOX. We recognize that a company whose only designated
ACFE was added to the board in 2003 or 2004 could have had a non-designated ACFE on the audit committee
before SOX. Either an existing audit committee member could possess financial expertise but not be designated
as an ACFE, or the designated ACFE who joined the board in 2003 or 2004 could have replaced another board
member who would have qualified as an ACFE.
6 All of the companies in our sample trade on a stock exchange (NYSE or Nasdaq) that requires at least one
audit committee member to possess financial expertise or sophistication. The 25 companies that fail to designate
an ACFE may still be in compliance with exchange-listing standards because the exchanges’ definition of
expertise / sophistication is broader than the SEC’s definition of an ACFE.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Company and Audit Committee Characteristics
Total Fortune NYSE NMS NDQ
(n  400) (n  100) (n  100) (n  100) (n  100)
Panel A: Company Characteristicsa
Total Sales (in $millions)
Mean 9,732.47 36,257.60 2,310.55 311.16 50.57
Median 462.28 24,864.00 1,361.94 85.36 17.91
Minimum 0.00 3,935.40 93.63 0.30 0.00
Maximum 213,199.00 213,199.00 15,867.00 7,722.00 869.00
Total Assets (in $millions)
Mean 34,628.27 131,032.20 6,363.60 935.47 181.84
Median 840.05 37,073.00 1,921.61 288.18 30.66
Minimum 2.29 5,474.16 130.45 13.85 2.29
Maximum 1,264,032.00 1,264,032.00 87,534.00 10,311.62 2,196.30
Panel B: Audit Committee Characteristicsb
Number of Audit Committee Members
Mean 3.81 4.62 3.84 3.38 3.39
Median 3 4 4 3 3
Minimum 2 3 3 2 2
Maximum 8 8 7 8 6
Number of Financial Experts
Mean 1.47 2.20 1.57 1.09 1.02
Median 1 1 1 1 1
Minimum 0 1 0 0 0
Maximum 6 6 6 3 3
a Total Sales and Assets are obtained from Compustat.
b Data for the number of audit committee members and financial experts are obtained from the 2004 proxy
statement or the fiscal 2003 Form 10-K when the proxy statement does not disclose the information.
Panel A of Table 2 provides some basic descriptive statistics on the companies included
in our sample. Mean sales are highest for the Fortune companies ($36,258 million) and
lowest for the NMS and NDQ companies ($311 million and $51 million, respectively).
Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the number of audit committee members and the
number of ACFEs. The mean number of audit committee members for the entire sample
is 3.81; on average, 1.47 of them are ACFEs. The means of the subsamples reveal that
numbers of members and experts increase with company size.
Transparency and Quality of Disclosures
Although the SEC specifies certain disclosures that companies must make with respect
to the financial expertise of their audit committees, the companies have considerable dis-
cretion as to the transparency of these disclosures. For example, some companies may only
disclose a very limited amount of information, while others may provide detailed expla-
nations about the financial expertise of their audit committee. We assess the transparency
of the disclosures by our sample of companies based on factors such as where the disclo-
sures are made, how many experts are named, and how detailed the disclosures are.
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Location of Disclosures
Companies can choose whether to include the disclosures in their 10-K, proxy state-
ment, or both. Figure 1 provides information on the percentage of companies in our sample
that make their disclosure in each of these filings. Most companies make this disclosure
available only in their proxy statement (80 percent), while some do so only in their 10-K
(12 percent). A smaller portion of our sample companies (6 percent) actually makes the
disclosure in both their proxy statement and 10-K. These results suggest that very few
companies are going beyond the minimum requirements with respect to where they make
their disclosures regarding audit committee financial expertise.
Number of Experts Named
Companies are permitted, but are not required, to disclose whether more than one
financial expert sits on the audit committee. As shown in Figure 2, approximately 28 percent
of the sample companies designate more than one ACFE. Almost all of these additional
financial experts are named. Disclosure of multiple financial experts is more common
among larger companies; 50 percent of Fortune companies and 34 percent of NYSE com-
panies reveal they have more than one financial expert. Only 13–14 percent of Nasdaq
companies disclose that they have multiple experts.7,8
We posit that some companies may name multiple experts, possibly including the entire
audit committee, as a means of diffusing the responsibility and potential liability that may
fall on one person if only a single financial expert is named. Alternatively, some companies
may believe that having more than one financial expert contributes to audit committee
effectiveness. As illustrated in Figure 2, approximately 9 percent of the companies assert
that every audit committee member is a financial expert. Very large companies are more
likely to claim that the entire audit committee is comprised of financial experts; 16 percent
of Fortune companies disclose that all committee members are financial experts, and this
proportion is significantly greater than the 4 to 5 percent of Nasdaq companies that make
comparable disclosures.
Level of Detail in Disclosures
Companies also have some discretion as to the level of detail they include in explaining
the company’s decision to not have an ACFE, or in their explanation of why an individual
director qualifies as an ACFE. As shown in Figure 2, approximately 6 percent of our
companies (five NYSE, eight NMS, and 12 NDQ companies) state they do not have an
ACFE. A few examples of the reasons given for not having a financial expert are provided
in Panel A of Exhibit 1. The most common disclosure simply points out that the company
does not have an ACFE, and that the company’s audit committee members are selected
based on their ability to oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of the
company. As DeFond and Francis (2005, 21) state, ‘‘the SEC is willing to consider good
reasons why some firms should not have experts.’’ In our view, simply stating that the
company does not have a financial expert and explaining the company’s reasons for se-
lecting the existing audit committee members does not comply with the SEC’s requirement
7 Fortune companies are more likely to designate multiple ACFEs than are NYSE companies (p  0.05), NMS
companies (p  0.01), and NDQ companies (p  0.01); NYSE companies are more likely to designate multiple
ACFEs than are NMS and NDQ companies (p  0.01).
8 All tests for differences in means throughout the paper are based on t-statistics (Z-statistics) for continuous
variables (proportions). The tests assess if the average value of a variable for a particular group is sufficiently
different from the average value for the comparison group to conclude that the cross-group difference is unlikely
to occur by chance.
358 Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Neal
Accounting Horizons, December 2006
FIGURE 1
Location of ACFE Disclosures
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to explain why a financial expert does not sit on the audit committee. Disclosing that the
company does not have a financial expert, which is a common disclosure for those com-
panies without an ACFE, does not explain why the company believes that an ACFE is not
needed.
As shown in Panel A of Exhibit 1, Protective Life (a NYSE firm) includes a very
detailed discussion of their reasons for not having an ACFE. This company reports that its
audit committee meets the independence and financial expertise requirements of the NYSE
(which are more lenient than the SEC’s ACFE definition), but that the company does not
believe that any of its audit committee members qualify as an ACFE, particularly consid-
ering the commentary that accompanied the SEC’s adopting release. Although the com-
position of this company’s audit committee includes three current CEOs, individuals who
have significant academic business training, and individuals who have experience working
in banking, investments, and mergers and acquisitions, we are left to conclude that none
of these individuals have experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating finan-
cial statements or experience in actively supervising one or more persons engaged in such
activities. As we discuss during our examination of the backgrounds of ACFEs in the next
section, this company’s conservative interpretation of the SEC’s rule—which we believe is
consistent with the Commission’s intent in its original rule proposal—does not appear to
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FIGURE 2
Frequencies of Designation and Disclosure of ACFEs by Sample Companiesa
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Fortune (n = 100)
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NMS  (n = 97)
NDQ (n = 96)
a Variable Definitions:
More than 1 ACFE  the percentage of companies designating more than one audit committee
financial expert;
Entire AC ACFE  the percentage of companies designating the entire audit committee of
the company as audit committee financial experts;
No ACFE  the percentage of companies disclosing not having an audit committee
financial expert;
Discuss  the percentage of filings containing significant discussion of the audit
committee financial expert; and
No Support for ACFE Designation  the percentage of companies for which we cannot determine from the
disclosure in the proxy or 10-K that any of the disclosed financial
experts meet the definition of an independent audit committee financial
expert. Unlike all the other categories, the percentage reported is based
on only those companies disclosing that they have an audit committee
financial expert (n  368 Total, n  100 Fortune, n  95 NYSE,
n  89 NMS, and n  84 NMS).
be the norm among public companies.9 Evidence reported below suggests that companies
routinely consider individuals with senior management experience to qualify as an ACFE,
regardless of the ambiguity of the audit committee member’s background in preparing,
9 In fact, Protective Life may be interpreting the SEC’s final rule too conservatively. Protective Life states that a
financial expert does not sit on its audit committee, but one of its audit committee members is an investment
banker. The SEC’s final rule indicates that audit committee members with a background in investment banking
or venture capital would appear to qualify as an ACFE (SEC 2003). Protective Life may not have designated
any of its audit committee members as ACFEs so as to not expose these individuals to additional litigation risk.
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EXHIBIT 1
Examples of ACFE Disclosures
Panel A: Reasons for Not Having an Audit Committee Financial Expert
Most Common Disclosure of Reason for Not Having an ACFE (similar disclosures appear 8
times)
The Board of Directors of the Company has determined that the Company does not have an
‘‘audit committee financial expert,’’ as defined in 17 CFR Section 228.401(e)(2), serving on its
Audit Committee. The Board has selected Audit Committee members based on the Board’s
determination that they are qualified to oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of
the Company and audits of the Company’s financial statements.
Detailed Reason for Not Having an ACFE
Protective Life Corp.
The members of the Board have determined that each member of the Audit Committee meets
the independence and financial expertise requirements of the New York Stock Exchange. The Board
does not feel that, under conservative interpretations of Items 401(h) of Regulation S-K (including
the commentary that accompanied the adopting release), the members of the Audit Committee meet
the definition of an audit committee financial expert. The Board nevertheless feels that ample
financial literacy, experience, and expertise is possessed by the current members of the Audit
Committee to perform the functions of the Committee and to provide appropriate oversight,
scrutiny, and guidance. For example, Mr. French has an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School; he
is currently Chairman and CEO of Dunn Investment Company, the parent of a group of companies
and an investor in equity securities. Mr. Cooper has a B.S. in Finance from the University of Notre
Dame; he is currently Chairman and CEO of Commonwealth National Bank, a privately held
national bank. Mr. Day has an M.B.A. in Finance from the University of Pennsylvania; he
previously served as the head of Goldman, Sachs & Co.’s mergers and acquisitions group and
currently is chairman of the Executive Committee of Jemison Investment Company, Inc., a privately
held investment company. Mr. James has an M.B.A. from The University of Alabama and a law
degree from the University of Virginia; he is currently the Chairman and CEO of Vulcan Materials
Company, a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. In addition, if any
Committee member feels it appropriate, the Committee has access, at Company expense, to
financial experts of the Committee’s choice who are actively in the business of giving expert advice
with respect to the kind of matters that may come before the Committee.
Example of a Questionable Reason for Not Having an ACFE
Crescent Banking Company
Given our non-urban location, to date we have been unable to identify a suitable candidate for
director that would qualify as an ‘‘audit committee financial expert,’’ as defined by the SEC, to
become a member of the Audit Committee. The Board of Directors believes that the incumbent
Audit Committee members’ financial acumen is strong and that they can discharge the Audit
Committee’s responsibilities.
Other Interesting Disclosure of No ACFE (4 other companies mention the ability of the board
to hire consultants as needed)
Central Virginia Bankshares Inc.
CVB has not currently designated an ‘‘audit committee financial expert.’’ The Audit Committee
has, however, engaged the accounting firm of Keiter Stephens Hurst Gary & Shreaves to serve as a
consultant to the Audit Committee. The Board believes that with Keiter Stephens’ assistance the
current members of the Audit Committee have the ability to understand financial statements and
generally accepted accounting principles, the ability to assess the general application of such
principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves, an understanding
of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and an understanding of audit committee
functions.
(continued on next page)
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EXHIBIT 1 (Continued)
Panel B: Disclosures of Companies Who Indicate They Have an ACFE
Most Common Disclosure of an ACFE
Lincare Holdings Inc.
The Board of Directors has designated William F. Miller III as the Audit Committee
‘‘Financial Expert’’ as defined by Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K of the Exchange Act and has
determined that he is independent within the meaning of Item 7(d)(3)(iv) of Schedule 14A of the
Exchange Act.
Cascade Financial Corp.
The current members of the Audit and Finance Committee are ‘‘independent’’ directors within
the meaning of both the NASDAQ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. Dr.
Murphy is an ‘‘audit committee financial expert’’ as defined under SEC rules.
Examples of Transparent ACFE Disclosure
Marathon Oil Corp.
Based on the attributes, education, and experience requirements set forth in Section 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and associated regulations, the Board of Directors has determined that
David A. Daberko, Charles R. Lee, and Dennis H. Reilley each qualify as an ‘‘Audit Committee
Financial Expert.’’
• Mr. Daberko is currently the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of National
City Corporation. In addition to certifying the effectiveness of internal controls and
procedures required by his position as CEO, Mr. Daberko’s previous positions with National
City required him to oversee internal accounting controls and set internal control policy. As
head of bank investments, he was responsible for overseeing accounting for that area. Mr.
Daberko holds an M.B.A. in finance from Case Western Reserve University.
• Mr. Lee held positions as Senior Vice President-Finance for Penn Central Corp. and
Columbia Pictures Industries Inc., and Senior Vice President of Finance with GTE
Corporation. He received an M.B.A. with distinction from the Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration.
• Mr. Reilley is the Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Praxair, Inc. In
addition to certifying the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures required by his
position as CEO, Mr. Reilley’s experience includes serving as chair of Entergy Corporation’s
audit committee. He holds a Bachelor of Science in finance from Oklahoma State University.
Standard Register Company
In addition, the board has determined that one member in particular satisfies the ‘‘Audit
Committee financial expert’’ qualifications contained in regulations issued pursuant to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. Specifically, the board has concluded that Audit Committee member Sherrill W.
Hudson qualifies as an Audit Committee financial expert given his 37-year career as a public
accountant and auditor. Mr. Hudson’s experience with respect to audits of financial statements of
publicly held companies, internal controls, application [of] GAAP and audit committee functions,
and his independence as a board member meets the criteria for ‘‘Audit Committee financial expert’’
established by the board in conformity with the regulations and New York Stock Exchange Listing
Standards. The Board has also affirmed that Mr. Hudson’s service on the audit committees of three
other publicly traded companies does not impair his ability to serve on the Company’s audit
committee, and, in fact, is viewed as an advantage.
auditing, analyzing, or evaluating financial statements, or directly supervising those who
perform these functions.
Some of the reasons given for not having a financial expert are novel, whereas others
are of questionable veracity. For example, one company reports they do not have an ACFE
but that they retain the services of an accounting firm to serve as a consultant to the audit
committee. This company argues that its audit committee, with assistance from the ac-
counting firm, has the same skill sets as an ACFE. Another company claims to be unable
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to attract a financial expert because of its non-urban location. The company is located
approximately 70 miles north of Atlanta, hardly a geographic area that suffers from a
paucity of financial experts.
Given the number of companies that disclose that they do not have an ACFE, we take
a closer look at exactly what the audit committees of these 25 companies look like. Some
audit committee members have unexpected backgrounds. For example, a couple of financial
institutions in our sample have a farmer sitting on their audit committee. In fact, one of
these companies has an audit committee that includes a farmer, an executive assistant, a
veterinarian, a property appraiser, an attorney, and the president of a company. However,
based on biographical sketches, each of the companies in our sample that does not disclose
an ACFE actually has an audit committee member who may meet the SEC’s criteria for
ACFE designation. In other words, all of these companies have at least one member on
their audit committee who is in a senior management position (i.e., CEO or president). This
suggests that companies are cautious in applying the more liberal definition of financial
expertise and do not automatically claim an ACFE even though they have members with
senior management experience.
Panel B of Exhibit 1 presents examples of disclosures by companies indicating that
they have an ACFE. The most common disclosure is to simply state the financial expert’s
name, indicate that (s)he is independent, and state that the individual qualifies as an ACFE
per the SEC’s rules. Exhibit 1 also contains examples of disclosures that go beyond the
boilerplate that characterizes most companies’ disclosures. In our view, transparent disclo-
sures provide the reasons why an individual qualifies to be designated as an ACFE. Since
the level of expertise among ACFEs is likely to vary, this additional disclosure allows
financial statement users to determine how much comfort they can gain from the presence
of a particular individual on the audit committee.
Per Figure 2, only 5 percent of sample companies provide a substantive discussion of
the qualifications of the ACFE. While the basis for a director being designated as an ACFE
is somewhat apparent if that director has either an accounting or finance background, the
basis for directors without such experience is not nearly as obvious. Absent a substantive
discussion by the company to explain the justification for their ACFE designation, ascer-
taining qualifications of CEOs and other officers from their biographical data in the proxy
is often impossible. We examined the information in the proxy statement and/or Form 10-
K to determine whether the named expert has the requisite background per the SEC’s final
rule. As documented in Figure 2 (see No Support for ACFE Designation10), we were unable
to do so in more than 40 percent (157/368) of the cases where a company claims to have
a financial expert.11 Our inability to independently verify the designated member’s expertise
is disconcerting. Moreover, the problem is most acute for the very largest companies—we
are unable to verify a named expert’s qualifications for 54 percent of Fortune companies
compared to between 33 percent and 42 percent of the companies in the other three
10 We consider the ACFE designation to be supported if the director has previous experience in accounting or
finance, or if there is a significant discussion as to how the director’s other experiences result in his /her financial
expertise.
11 In addition to the company’s ACFE disclosure, we also read the biographical sketch of the named expert included
in the company’s proxy statement. One limitation of our approach is that companies are only required to disclose
the employment history of their directors for the past five years. However, companies can and often do provide
more details on a director’s employment history.
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groups.12,13 This result likely reflects the bias of very large companies to populate their
boards, and the resulting board committees, with CEOs of other companies, regardless of
an individual’s background in finance or accounting.
BACKGROUND OF ACFEs
Figure 3 provides descriptive information on the 582 financial experts identified by the
400 companies in our sample. Approximately 40 percent of financial experts serve as the
audit committee chair, and the audit committee chair is more likely to be a financial expert
for smaller companies.14,15 Only 19 percent of the identified financial experts are CPAs,
and CPAs are much less likely to serve on the audit committees of larger companies. For
example, only 10 (16) percent of the ACFEs of Fortune (NYSE) companies are CPAs,
whereas approximately 30 percent of Nasdaq companies have a CPA as their financial
expert.16 The minimal presence of CPAs on the audit committees of large companies is
surprising, particularly given the importance the SEC attached to accounting expertise in
the commentary surrounding the final rule. Furthermore, prior research provides some ev-
idence that the stock market favors ACFEs with an accounting background (DeFond et al.
2005).17
Figure 3 also shows that approximately 22 percent of the designated financial experts
have been added to the audit committee in the past two years. Designated ACFEs for
Nasdaq companies are more likely to have joined the board in 2003 or 2004 than are the
designated ACFEs for Fortune companies (p  0.01 for NMS companies, p  0.05 for
NDQ companies). Some of this increase is likely in response to the SEC rule; Table 1
shows that 81 companies added their only designated ACFE during this time period.
Table 3 provides data on the current and prior work experiences of individuals desig-
nated as an ACFE.18 Panel A shows that in terms of current full-time employment, the clear
modal background of an ACFE is top management (defined as CEO, President, COO, or
chairman of the board). Although this background is more common for experts with Fortune
and NYSE companies than it is among NDQ companies (p  0.05 for Fortune companies
12 These pairwise differences are significant as follows: p  0.05 when comparing Fortune companies to either
NYSE or NDQ companies, and p  0.01 when comparing Fortune companies to NMS companies.
13 In addition, approximately 58 percent of the individual directors named as ACFEs cannot be independently
verified, including 74 percent of the financial experts for Fortune companies. A greater percentage of financial
experts cannot be independently verified for Fortune companies compared to NYSE, NMS, and NDQ companies
(p  0.01).
14 Given that some audit committees have more than one financial expert, the percentage of companies in our
sample that have an ACFE serving as the chair of their audit committee is higher, at almost 60 percent (236 /
400).
15 NMS companies are more likely to have an audit committee chair who is a financial expert than are Fortune
companies (p  0.01) and NDQ companies (p  0.05); NYSE companies are more likely to have an audit
committee chair who is a financial expert than are Fortune companies (p  0.10).
16 These pairwise differences are significant as follows: p  0.10 when comparing Fortune companies to NYSE
companies, p  0.01 when comparing Fortune companies to NMS and NDQ companies, p  0.05 when
comparing NYSE companies to NMS companies, and p  0.01 when comparing NYSE companies to NDQ
companies.
17 DeFond et al. (2005) find a significant positive stock price reaction when a financial expert with an accounting
background is added to the audit committee, but they fail to find any significant stock price reaction when a
nonaccounting financial expert is added to the audit committee. However, Davidson et al. (2004) find a significant
positive stock price reaction to the appointment of a financial expert to the audit committee, even using different
definitions of financial expertise.
18 In evaluating the current employment of an ACFE (Panel A), individuals are placed into only one category. For
example, if an individual serves as CFO and treasurer, which is included in the other financial category, they
would be categorized as CFO. Conversely, when evaluating previous employment (Panel B), which often en-
compasses multiple previous full-time positions, we categorize individuals into as many categories as apply (i.e.,
the percentages do not sum to 100 percent).
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FIGURE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Individual Audit Committee Financial Expertsa
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a Variable Definitions:
Audit Committee Chair  the percentage of financial experts who are also the chair of the audit committee;
CPA  the percentage of financial experts who are also certified public accountants; and
Tenure less than 2 years  the percentage of financial experts who have tenures on the board of less than two
years.
and p  0.10 for NYSE companies), it is the most common background for all four groups.
Retired individuals are the group next most likely to serve as a financial expert. Financial
experts who are retired are more likely to serve on the audit committees of Fortune com-
panies than of NYSE, NMS, and NDQ companies (p  0.01).
As expected, the percentage of financial experts with a background in finance and
accounting is low. Only 6 percent of financial experts are a sitting CFO and only 5 percent
are currently employed as an auditor in public accounting, although almost 16 percent of
NDQ companies have a financial expert who is currently employed in public accounting.
Even if we define an accounting/finance background broadly (i.e., CFO, VP-Finance, au-
ditor, investment banker, venture capitalist, brokerage/mutual fund experience, treasurer,
controller, etc.), only approximately 16 percent of the financial experts have such a back-
ground. However, per Panel B of Table 3, when considering both current and prior job
experience, 21 percent of financial experts have served as a CFO, and 12 percent have
experience working as an auditor in a public accounting firm. However, experience as a
senior executive still dominates accounting/finance backgrounds even when prior positions
are considered.
Our results are consistent with those reported by DeFond et al. (2005) and demonstrate
that many ACFEs do not have a background in accounting or finance. However, a key
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TABLE 3
Audit Committee Financial Experts
Current and Prior Work Experience
Total
(n  582)
No. %
Fortune
(n  220)
No. %
NYSE
(n  152)
No. %
NMS
(n  109)
No. %
NDQ
(n  101)
No. %
Test of Differences
Fortune
versus
NYSE
Fortune
versus
NMS
Fortune
versus
NDQ
NYSE
versus
NMS
NYSE
versus
NDQ
NMS
versus
NDQ
Panel A: Current Employment of All Audit Committee Financial Expertsa
Top Managementc 220 37.80 93 42.27 61 40.13 36 33.03 30 29.70 ** *
Retired 125 21.48 72 32.73 26 17.11 20 18.35 7 6.93 *** *** *** ** **
CFO 36 6.19 10 4.55 12 7.89 6 5.50 8 7.92
Auditord 29 4.98 3 1.36 3 1.97 7 6.42 16 15.84 *** *** * *** **
Other Financiale 27 4.64 6 2.73 12 7.89 4 3.67 5 4.95 **
Financialf 92 15.81 19 8.64 27 17.75 17 15.59 29 28.71 *** * *** ** **
Panel B: Current and Previous Employment of all Audit Committee Financial Expertsb
Top Managementc 402 69.07 188 85.45 104 68.42 63 57.80 47 46.53 *** *** *** * ***
Retired 125 21.48 72 32.73 26 17.11 20 18.35 7 6.93 *** *** *** ** **
CFO 120 20.62 24 10.91 40 26.32 36 33.03 20 19.80 *** *** ** **
Auditord 70 12.03 13 5.91 16 10.53 19 17.43 22 21.78 *** *** **
Other Financiale 81 13.92 15 6.82 27 17.76 16 14.68 23 22.77 *** ** ***
Financialf 220 37.80 48 21.82 63 41.45 58 53.21 51 50.50 *** *** *** *
*, **, *** Indicate significance at p  0.10, p  0.05, and p  0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
a Current work experience is coded based on one job title, the highest position currently held. Several individuals hold multiple positions such as CFO and Treasurer.
These individuals are coded as CFO.
b Current and previous work experience is coded based on all positions currently or previously held. Thus, one individual may appear in multiple rows in Panel B,
which results in the sum of the CEO, Auditor, and Other Financial categories exceeding the numbers of members with a Financial background.
c Individuals who hold the position of Chairman, CEO, President, or Chief Operating Officer.
d Individuals who have experience as an accountant in a public accounting firm.
e Individuals who hold the position of VP-Finance, venture capitalist, investment banker, brokerage /mutual fund experience, treasurer, controller, etc.
f Individuals who hold any position included in the CFO, auditor, or other financial categories.
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difference between our results and those reported by DeFond et al. is that we use company
designations to identify the audit committee members who should be considered an ACFE.
Most prior researchers, including DeFond et al., identify ACFEs based on the biographical
data included in the proxy statement. As discussed in the previous section, many companies
do not supply sufficient information to accurately identify which directors are ACFEs. To
demonstrate the significance of the difference in how ACFEs are identified, we compare
the ACFEs identified in our sample to the ACFEs who would have been identified using
the DeFond et al. approach. This is done by reviewing the biographical data in each proxy
statement and coding ACFEs based on that data while ignoring the companies’ ACFE
designations.
Results (not tabulated) document a substantial difference in the number and types of
financial experts identified. Specifically, 86 directors are designated by their company as
an ACFE, but they would not be identified as such using the DeFond et al. approach19 and
proxy statement data. In addition, of the 940 audit committee members in our sample who
are not designated by their company as an ACFE, more than 50 percent would have been
classified as an ACFE using the DeFond et al. approach. In many cases, companies do not
designate a CEO or president as an ACFE, possibly because the board believes that the
individual audit committee member lacks financial expertise, or in order to limit the direc-
tor’s legal liability. The undesignated audit committee members who qualify under the
DeFond et al. approach come from 288 companies. Of these, 256 companies designated at
least one ACFE; their failure to designate additional qualified audit committee members as
ACFEs likely reflects conservatism on the part of the board rather than errors in identifying
ACFEs. Conversely, for the 32 companies that do not designate an ACFE (25 companies
state that they do not have an ACFE, and seven companies make no disclosure), the failure
to designate an audit committee member as an ACFE who meets the DeFond et al. definition
of expertise reflects either (1) that the audit committee member identified using the DeFond
et al. approach does not really possess financial expertise, or (2) extreme unwillingness on
the part of the company to designate an ACFE.
These analyses indicate that assessments of financial expertise on audit committees are
likely to be understated, no matter how expertise is assessed. If expertise is measured per
the extant literature (e.g., DeFond et al. 2005), then individuals with financial expertise that
is not transparent from reading the proxy statement will not be identified. In addition, if
expertise is measured based on firm designations, then individuals with financial expertise
may not be identified because companies only have to designate one expert. The latter
problem appears more acute than the former.
WHY COMPANIES HAVE/DISCLOSE ACFEs
We expect the SEC’s financial expert disclosure requirement to pressure companies to
designate at least one director who has financial expertise on their audit committee. How-
ever, as noted previously, 32 companies in our sample do not disclose an ACFE (25 state
they do not have an ACFE and seven make no disclosure at all regarding financial expertise
on its audit committee). We examine whether certain company characteristics, largely drawn
from the literature on agency costs and corporate governance, explain whether a company
discloses the presence of a financial expert on their audit committee. Companies facing
greater agency costs should be more likely to have a financial expert on their audit com-
mittee than those companies facing lower agency costs. The relation between corporate
19 DeFond et al. (2005) define an ACFE as an individual who possesses accounting expertise (similar to our
definition) or as an individual who holds the position of CEO or president.
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governance variables and whether a financial expert is present on the audit committee is
less obvious. A better-governed firm may seek to further strengthen its governance through
the inclusion of a financial expert, suggesting a positive relation between corporate gov-
ernance quality and the presence of an ACFE (DeFond et al. 2005). Conversely, some firms
may view corporate governance quality as a substitute for audit committee financial ex-
pertise, suggesting a negative relation between corporate governance quality and the pres-
ence of an ACFE (Engel 2005).
We test the relation between company characteristics and whether a company designates
one or more ACFEs using the following logistic regression model:
ACFE  b0  b1SIZE  b2CS ISSUANCE  b3DEBT ISSUANCE  b4BIG4
 b5LITIGATION  b6CEO DUALITY  b7INST OWN
 b8BLOCKHOLDER  b9AC DILIGENCE  b10NMS  b11NYSE  ε
where:
ACFE  1 if the company designates an ACFE, else 0;
SIZE  the natural log of market value of equity;
CS ISSUANCE  1 if the company has proceeds from the issuance of common stock
greater than 5 percent of stockholders’ equity, else 0;
DEBT ISSUANCE  1 if the company has proceeds from the issuance of debt, else 0;
BIG4  1 if the company engages one of the largest four audit firms, else 0;
LITIGATION  1 if the company is in a litigious industry, else 0;
CEO DUALITY  1 if the chief executive officer is also the chairman of the board, else
0;
INST OWN  percentage of stock held by institutional investors;
BLOCKHOLDER  1 if the company has a non-insider holder of 5 percent or more of
the outstanding shares, else 0;
AC DILIGENCE  1 if the audit committee meets four or more times, else 0;
NMS  1 if the company trades on the Nasdaq National Market System, else
0; and
NYSE  1 if the company trades on the New York Stock Exchange, else 0.
Larger firms are associated with greater agency costs (Simunic and Stein 1987). In
addition, the relative cost of attracting a financial expert to the audit committee should be
less for a larger company than a smaller company (Verrecchia 2001). For both reasons, we
expect a positive relation between company size and the designation of an ACFE.
Since managers and potential investors have asymmetric information when the firm
issues securities, we expect agency costs to be higher when a company issues debt or equity
securities. For example, the finance literature finds that stock prices generally decline when
a firm announces a new stock issue, and this result is attributed to asymmetries in the
information available to managers and investors (Ehrhardt and Brigham 2003). In addition,
Dechow et al. (1996) find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely around securities’
issuances. The presence of an ACFE should reduce the risk of fraudulent financial reporting
(Abbott et al. 2004); therefore, we expect a positive relation between securities’ issuances
(CS ISSUANCE and DEBT ISSUANCE) and the designation of an ACFE.
Prior literature finds that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely when the positions
of CEO and the chairman of the board (COB) are held by the same individual (Dechow et
al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2000). This result suggests that the benefits of having an ACFE are
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greater in the case of CEO and COB duality. Conversely, when the CEO and COB positions
are held by the same person, this individual often wields significant power, and (s)he may
maximize management’s financial reporting discretion by not having an ACFE.
Blockholders and institutional investors can play an important role in monitoring man-
agerial behavior (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Field and Sheehan 2004). As such, an outside
blockholder or institutional investor with significant holdings may exert pressure on man-
agement to have a financial expert on the audit committee. Conversely, the monitoring
benefits offered by an outside blockholder or institutional investor may act as a substitute
for the benefits of an ACFE.
Abbott et al. (2004) provide evidence of a negative association between the diligence
of the audit committee and restatements. That is, companies whose audit committees meet
frequently are less likely to have a subsequent restatement. Companies with a more diligent
audit committee may also be interested in having a financial expert on their committee.
Conversely, some companies may view audit committee diligence as an acceptable substi-
tute for audit committee financial expertise.20
Abbott and Parker (2000) document a positive association between audit committee
effectiveness and the selection of an industry specialist auditor. Although not addressed by
Abbott and Parker (2000) as a component of audit committee effectiveness, the presence
of an ACFE may also be positively associated with the selection of a high-quality auditor
(i.e., a Big 4 audit firm). Conversely, some companies may view the presence of an ACFE
and the selection of a Big 4 auditor as substitutes.21
Audit committee members face significant risks as a result of their committee service,
including the risk of litigation in the event of shortcomings in the financial reporting quality
of their company. This litigation-related risk is not equal across industries, and companies
that operate in highly litigious industries may place more emphasis on having an ACFE.22
However, concerns over increased legal liability that may result from being named as an
ACFE may cause some directors to be even more cautious about being designated as a
financial expert. Thus, audit committee members may be less willing to be designated as
an ACFE in those industries with increased litigation risk.
Finally, the likelihood of having an audit committee financial expert may differ based
on different regulatory regimes and market expectations across different stock exchanges.
Thus, we include dummy variables for whether the company is traded on either the NYSE
or Nasdaq’s National Market System (the effect of NDQ trading on the likelihood of having
an ACFE appears in the regression intercept). The Fortune companies in the sample are
also captured by these indicator variables based on the exchange on which they are listed;
thus, unlike the prior tables that separate the sample into four groups, only three exchange-
based groups are used in the regression analyses.
20 Abbott et al. (2004) also examine the independence of the audit committee. As a sensitivity test, we also include
a variable to capture the independence of the audit committee. This variable, whether measured as a dichotomous
or continuous variable, is not significant, and the results of our main model are unchanged. The lack of results
on our measures of audit committee independence is likely due to the limited variation in audit committee
independence for our sample companies.
21 The direction of causality between number of audit committee meetings (our proxy for committee diligence)
and the designation of an ACFE, and between the presence of a Big 4 firm and an ACFE, may run in the
opposite direction. That is, an ACFE may result in more audit committee meetings or in the selection of a Big
4 firm. In this exploratory study, we are simply examining the relation between these variables and the desig-
nation of an ACFE.
22 Using the coding scheme in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005), we define litigious industries as drugs (SIC codes
2833–2836), computers (3570–3577 and 7370), electronics (3600–3674), and retail trade (5200–5961).
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In addition to examining the association between company characteristics and the des-
ignation of an ACFE, we also examine, for those companies that have an ACFE, the
association between those characteristics and the type of ACFE. Specifically, we examine
the characteristics that are associated with companies having an ACFE with an accounting
or finance background versus an ACFE with a more general business background. We use
the same model as before with the exception that the dependent variable is now ACCT,
which equals 1 if the company has an ACFE with an accounting or finance background,
and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in our regression models. The
last column under ‘‘Designation of an ACFE’’ reports the p-values for testing the difference
in the means for firms that have versus have not designated an ACFE. The differences are
significantly positive for (1) company size, (2) debt issuance, (3) use of a Big 4 auditor,
(4) having a CEO who is also chairman of the board, (5) the percentage of stock owned
by institutional investors, (6) having an audit committee that meets at least four times per
year, and (7) listing on the New York Stock Exchange. Thus, each of these variables is
individually positively associated with designating an ACFE. There is also a significant
negative difference for companies listed on Nasdaq’s NDQ system.23 None of the other
differences are significant. The columns under ‘‘Type of ACFE’’ show that for those com-
panies that designate an ACFE, their financial expert is more likely to have an accounting
or finance background if (1) the company issued common stock, (2) a large outside block-
holder exists, or (3) the company is listed on Nasdaq’s NMS. Also, larger companies and
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are less likely to have an ACFE with
an accounting or finance background.
Logistic Regression Results
Designation of an ACFE
Table 5 presents the logistic regression results. The model that examines the designation
of an ACFE is significant (p  0.01), and the model’s pseudo-R2 is 18 percent. As expected,
company size is positively associated with the designation of an audit committee financial
expert (p  0.05).24 Also, companies that operate in highly litigious industries are also
more likely to designate an audit committee financial expert (p  0.10). Finally, companies
are more likely to designate a financial expert if their audit committee meets at least four
times per year (p  0.05). We do not find an association between the designation of an
ACFE and any of the other variables in our model.
23 We caution against placing too much reliance on the significance of these associations because several of these
variables are correlated. Specifically, company size is highly correlated with use of a Big 4 auditor (rho  0.56),
having a CEO who is also chairman of the board (rho  0.35), the percentage of stock owned by institutional
investors (rho  0.61), and being listed on the NYSE (rho  0.73). In addition, being listed on the NYSE is
highly correlated with use of a Big 4 auditor (rho  0.47), having a CEO who is also chairman of the board
(rho  0.36), and the percentage of stock owned by institutional investors (rho  0.59). Finally, issuing debt
securities is negatively correlated with issuing equity securities (rho  –0.52), but positively correlated with use
of a Big 4 auditor (rho  0.37). The percentage of stock owned by institutional investors is positively correlated
with use of a Big 4 auditor (rho  0.56). All of the remaining correlations are 0.35 or less.
24 Given the correlations reported in footnote 23, the significant mean differences in Table 4 and insignificant
coefficients in Table 5 could be the result of multicollinearity. Unreported regressions using subsets of variables
confirm that the explanatory power of Big 4, CEO duality, institutional ownership, and stock exchange listing
disappears when size is included in the model.
370
Carcello,H
ollingsworth,
a
nd
Neal
Accounting
H
orizons,D
ecem
ber
2006
TABLE 4
Means of Variables that May Explain ACFE Designation and/or Type
Variablea
Entire
Sample
(n  398)b
Designation of an ACFE
ACFE
Firms
(n  366)
No ACFE
Firms
(n  32)
(ACFE 
No ACFE)c
Type of ACFEd
Acct
ACFE Firms
(n  200)
Non-Acct
ACFE Firms
(n  164)
(Acct 
Non-Acct)c
SIZE 14,163.650 15,363.350 442.135 0.0171 9,766.623 22,330.570 0.0026
CS ISSUANCE 0.415 0.407 0.500 0.3064 0.445 0.366 0.0633
DEBT ISSUANCE 0.839 0.847 0.750 0.0761 0.855 0.835 0.3028
BIG4 0.804 0.825 0.563 0.0003 0.800 0.860 0.1338
LITIGATION 0.206 0.216 0.094 0.1015 0.220 0.207 0.7692
CEO DUALITY 0.636 0.653 0.438 0.0151 0.635 0.671 0.4767
INST OWN 0.480 0.499 0.259 0.0000 0.514 0.481 0.3153
BLOCKHOLDER 0.709 0.708 0.719 0.8946 0.750 0.652 0.0421
AC DILIGENCE 0.950 0.964 0.781 0.0000 0.975 0.951 0.2238
NMSe 0.261 0.254 0.344 0.2683 0.300 0.195 0.0220
NYSEe 0.490 0.519 0.156 0.0001 0.480 0.573 0.0766
NDQe 0.249 0.227 0.500 0.0006 0.220 0.232 0.7902
a Variable Definitions:
SIZE  firm’s price per share at fiscal year-end (Compustat #199) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (Compustat #25), in millions;
CS ISSUANCE  1 if the company has proceeds from the issuance of common stock (Compustat #108) greater than 5 percent of stockholders’ equity (Compustat
#216), else 0;
DEBT ISSUANCE  1 if the company has proceeds from the issuance of debt; else 0 (Compustat #111);
BIG4  1 if the firm engages one of the largest four audit firms, else 0 (Compustat #149);
LITIGATION  1 if the company is in a litigious industry, else 0. Litigious industries are defined as SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–
5961, and 7370 (Compustat #324);
CEO DUALITY  1 if the chief executive officer is the chairman of the board, else 0 (Proxy);
INST OWN  percentage of stock held by institutional investors (Compact D/SEC);
BLOCKHOLDER  1 if a non-insider holds 5 percent or more of the company’s outstanding shares, else 0 (Proxy);
AC DILIGENCE  1 if the audit committee meets four or more times, else 0 (Proxy);
NMS  1 if firm is traded on the Nasdaq National Market System, else 0 (Compact D/SEC);
NYSE  1 if firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, else 0 (Compact D/SEC);
NDQ  1 if firm is traded on the Nasdaq National Dealer Quotation, else 0 (Compact D/SEC).
b Two of 400 companies in our original sample do not disclose the number of audit committee meetings (AC DILIGENCE). These companies are excluded from our
logistic regression models.
c Values represent p-values from one-tailed tests for differences between groups for variables whose relation to the dependent variable is predicted (SIZE,
CS ISSUANCE, and DEBT ISSUANCE), and two-tailed tests for all other variables. Test for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (Z-statistics) for
continuous variables (proportions).
d Two of the 366 companies that disclose the existence of an ACFE do not provide the name of the expert. Therefore, for these two companies we cannot categorize
the ACFE as an Acct ACFE or as a Non-Acct ACFE.
e Each exchange variable includes the companies in the Fortune subsample that trade on that exchange (96 NYSE, 4 NMS, 0 NDQ).
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TABLE 5
Logistic Regressions
Variablec
Expected
Sign
Designation of
an ACFE
(ACFE)a
Estimated
Coefficient p-valued
Type of ACFE
(ACCT)b
Estimated
Coefficient p-valued
Intercept 0.5179 0.598 0.9664 0.191
SIZE  0.3139 0.033 0.0810 0.226
CS ISSUANCE  0.0537 0.457 0.5203 0.028
DEBT ISSUANCE  0.0659 0.916 0.6351 0.055
BIG4 ? 0.2688 0.612 0.8561 0.032
LITIGATION ? 1.3110 0.052 0.0312 0.913
CEO DUALITY ? 0.2501 0.548 0.0265 0.915
INST OWN ? 1.2763 0.216 1.1645 0.037
BLOCKHOLDER ? 0.6351 0.190 0.1296 0.625
AC DILIGENCE ? 1.3664 0.024 0.8746 0.167
NMS ? 0.3634 0.506 0.5372 0.171
NYSE ? 0.0708 0.939 0.0623 0.898
Number of Observations 398 364
Chi-Square for Model 39.62 23.23
(degrees of freedom) 11 11
p-value 0.0000 0.0164
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.05
a This analysis examines all sample companies with the requisite data. The dependent variable for this analysis is
coded 1 if the company discloses having an ACFE, else 0.
b This analysis examines all companies that disclose having at least one ACFE. The dependent variable for this
analysis is coded 1 if the company discloses having at least one ACFE with an accounting background, else 0.
c See Table 4 for variable definitions.
d Values represent p-values from one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent
variable is (is not) predicted.
Type of ACFE
The logistic regression model that examines whether the ACFE has an accounting or
finance background is significant (p  0.01) and the model’s pseudo-R2 is 5 percent. As
expected, having an ACFE with an accounting or finance background is significantly as-
sociated with DEBT ISSUANCE (p  0.10) and CS ISSUANCE (p  0.05). This suggests
that companies are more likely to designate an ACFE who has an accounting or finance
background if they are going to the capital markets to raise funds. The percentage of stock
owned by institutional investors is also significantly positively associated with the presence
of an ACFE with an accounting or finance background (p  0.05). This is consistent with
institutional shareholders putting pressure on the company to have a qualified audit com-
mittee financial expert. However, the significant negative association between having an
accounting ACFE and the use of a Big 4 audit firm (p  0.05) seems to suggest that the
selection of a Big 4 auditor acts as a substitute for designating an accounting ACFE.
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SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires all public companies to disclose whether a financial
expert sits on the audit committee. We examine the initial disclosures made under the SEC’s
financial expert disclosure rule by a broad cross-section of public companies. Although
almost every company in our sample complies with the new rule, the quality of their
disclosure is often lacking and is limited to a minimal, typically boilerplate, explanation of
why an individual director is designated as an ACFE. Also, a nontrivial number of com-
panies disclose that they do not have an ACFE while others designate multiple ACFEs.
Consistent with prior research, we also find that the typical ACFE lacks recent, direct
experience in accounting or finance; this finding is particularly pronounced for larger com-
panies. However, unlike prior research that had to classify directors as financial experts
based on biographical data in the proxy statement, we rely on classifications made by the
companies in their disclosures. Our results highlight substantial differences in the classifi-
cation of financial experts using these alternative approaches, including the apparent reluc-
tance of some companies to name seemingly qualified directors as ACFEs, possibly due to
concerns about the legal liability faced by designated ACFEs. Finally, we identify certain
company characteristics that are associated with the designation or type of financial expert
on the audit committee.
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, although we attempt to examine
disclosure behavior among very large companies and a random sample of other exchange-
traded companies, our sample could be nonrepresentative of the underlying populations
from which it is drawn. Second, we are dependent on companies’ public disclosures in their
10-Ks and proxy statements for our analyses.
Given the newness of the SEC’s financial expert disclosure rule, a number of oppor-
tunities exist for future research. Among the questions that researchers might examine
include:
● Why do some companies choose to designate more than one financial expert on their
audit committee?
● Why are some companies reluctant to designate seemingly qualified directors as
ACFEs while other companies designate multiple ACFEs?
● Do companies prone to more extensive earnings management experience a larger
positive stock price reaction upon the appointment of an ACFE than companies less
prone to earnings management?
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